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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

8540

ROBERT ELTON WOODALL,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
From the facts of the case there seems no question but
what a trailer house was utilized as a bar and house of ill
fame in Grand County, Utah from on or about October 29,
1954 to December 23rd of that year. The trailer house was
divided in two sections, one for each purpose; at the outset
Jerry McAllister and Bobby Miller were the "resident oper-
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ators". There is some conflict in the evidence as to whether
or not Robert Elton Woodall, defendant and appellant, was
also an occupant of the premises. The fact that Woodall
was in or about the premises in one capacity or another
during all of the period of time involved is not controverted
by any of the testimony. When Jerry McAllister departed
the county, state, and trailer, the state complained that
Woodall induced, persuaded, encouraged and enticed Ida
E. Duclo, also known as Pat Morgan, a female person to
become a prostitute. As a result thereof, Robert Elton
Woodall was convicted of pandering and thereupon sentenced to a term in the state prison for not to exceed twenty
years.
"Jerry" was the blond, "Bobby" the redhead, "Pat" the
brunette (R. 7). We shall hereinafter refer to these ladies
of the maison de joie by their own adopted nicknames.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Pat, the victim, age 22, was employed at a resort some
fifteen or so miles out of Moab, Utah, known as the Hole
in the Rock; she had been so employed from about the last
week in September to about the first week of December,
l 954 ( R. 6) . Pat met the defendant at her work some time
in October of that year when he brought two girls in for
a meal (R. 6). On December 12, 1954, Pat was among the,
unemployed, the cafe apparently having ceased operating
( R. 9) . On the night of December 12th Pat went to work
for the defendant as a barmaid selling whiskey at a wage
of $5.00 per night plus 25c on the "Bee shots"; she re·
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mained so employed for two nights. Pat's place of employment was a trailer house located on "Blue Hill" a spot some
1n\1
six miles closer to Moab than the Hole in the Rock. Pat's
w~
co-tenant of the trailer was "Bobby" (R. 56) whose ad'a~
mitted occupation was prostitution ( R. 45) .
1\ml~l

:~

Bobby had known the defendant since May or June of
1954; she had first met him in Las Vegas, Nevada (R. 43).
~Ot!J 1 Bobby arrived in Moab the latter part of October, 1954, and
!~ about the third week after that moved into the trailer (R.
1~H 44). Bobby resided there with Jerry and the defendant
~11 Robert Elton \Voodall (R. 44).
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Jerry was an alleged prostitute; (R. 56, 57) she admitted having been paid for her services as a prostitute (R.
91). Jerry had a bank account at the First National Bank
of Moab in the name of Mrs. Joan Woodall ( R. 100) . Jerry
left the State of Utah some time around the middle of December (R. 91) ; prior thereto and while Jerry was living
at the trailer the defendant was accustomed to leave some
of his clothes at the trailer (R. 106). As heretofore stated,
Pat replaced Jerry as a tenant of the trailer house ; as a
barmaid on December 12th (R. 9), and as a prostitute on
December 14th (R. 11, 12, 13). The police arrived at the
scene on the 23rd day of December and then and there
terminated both girls' employment (R. 13).

rKWitl

~~~rr

Pat was the first witness called by the State. Pat testi~illl~t fied as to her employment at the Hole in the Rock as a
~~~ waitress, as to meeting the defendant and as to having
rentro' accepted employment as a barmaid for the defendant at the
yatl' trailer (R. 5, 11). Pat said the defendant asked her if she
~"; ~
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"wouldn't go ahead and work as a prostitute" (R. 11) and
that she told him "I would try anything once" (R. 11). Pat ,
and the defendant reached an agreement: Pat,
"was to charge $10.00 * * * He showed me
where to put the money in a little drawer and everything. And I was to keep $5.00 and give him five"
(R. 12).
On cross examination, Pat was questioned about an alleged
conversation had with Jerry in the presence of Pat's husband; (R. 16). Pat denied having gone to Jerry seeking
employment as a prostitute (R. 16). Pat denied having
conversed with Bobby on the subject of prostitution before
having gone to work at the trailer (R. 21). Pat denied
having ever worked as a prostitute prior to her employment
by the defendant as such (R. 18, 38). Mter her arrest, Pat
was complained against as being a prostitute and she
pleaded guilty to the charge (R. 41).
"Bobby", was the next witness for the State. Bobby
told of her acquaintance with the defendant, as to having
lived in the trailer with Jerry and as to having occupied
herself thereat as a prostitute (R. 42, 45). Bobby told of
Pat's employment by the defendant as a barmaid at $5.00
a night and 25c a "Bee" drink; (R. 46) and that Pat had
"said that she would come down with the understanding
that she was just to tend bar" (R. 47). Bobby testified as
to Pat's having worked as a barmaid for a couple of days
<R. 48) and then as to a conversation had in the trailer
house on December 14th about Pat's "further employment"
(R. 4R). Bobby, while addressing her Christmas cards,
heard the defendant tell Pat that "since she'd been seen
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around Moab with me (Bobby) and that I had such a bad
reputation that her reputation was the same as mine now
so she might as well go all the way. She'd get more money.
There was more money in it that way" (R. 48). Bobby
~ said that subsequent to this conversation Pat engaged in
nl prostitution (R. 50, 75). The defendant came to the trailer
house almost every day, according to Bobby, to see that they
~~ had plenty of water or oil and butane; (R. 51) the defen~~ dant took his meals there (R. 51). Bobby said that neither
·~ Pat nor Pat's husband had said in her presence that Pat
lM
had previously been a prostitute or he a hustler (R. 67).
111 Bobby did not discuss with Pat the possibility of Pat's going
1\~ to work as a prostitute (R. 68). Bobby did not recall Pat
t!
coming to the trailer with her husband and having a conrm versation with Jerry (R. 71). Bobby was yet to be sen~ tenced on a charge of being a prostitute (R. 75) .
1

UJ:

The state called next Seth Wright, Sheriff, San Juan
d County. The sheriff first knew Pat as a waitress at the
m~ Hole in the Rock; (R. 77), he later arrested her at the
!tdl trailer at Blue Hill (R. 77).
lr~

Frank Pester, an investigator for the State Health De-

a~l partment V. D. Control was the next witness for the proseIt~ cution (R. 81). He investigated the activities at the trailer
e$1 on the nights of December 21st and 22nd and participated

~ in the raid on December 23rd (R. 82). He found Bobby
~~~~ and Pat at the trailer on these occasions (R. 82). He found
tile~ that prostitution was being practiced thereat (R. 83).
~~~~r
naJ~
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The State Rested.
The defense moved for a directed verdict of not guilty
or to dismiss the information and the court denied the
motion (R. 87, 88). The defense called as a witness Jerry
( R. 88) . The witness was acquainted with the defendant,
with Pat and Pat's husband and with Bobby (R. 88, 89).
Jerry said that Pat came with her husband Duane to the
trailer house, and that "Ida Duclo (Pat) asked me if she
could come to work in the trailer as a prostitute and I said
'no'. And she asked why. And I said 'I don't want anytking
to do with turning a new girl out'. And Duane Duclo stepped
in and said that Ida (Pat) had worked before. And I cuked

her a few questions pertaining to prostitution and she
couldn't answer them. And she started to cry and stepped
out of the trailer and Duane went out with her" (R. 90).
The defendant did errands for this witness while she was
residing at the trailer house (R. 91). Jerry and Bobby lived
at the trailer together; (R. 93) it was Jerry's trailer and
she was in charge (R. 103). The defendant left clothes in
the trailer house (R. 106, 107). Jerry departed, trailer and
all, around the middle of December; (R. 104) she did not
come back until the day preceding her being called as a
witness (R. 105). Jerry was not in love with the defendant
(R. 105) but she had called him on the telephone while he
was in jail (R. 106) and had written him (R. 107), closing
her letter as follows: ""Veil honey I better close now. Write
to me please. I sure love you. Lots of love, Jerry" (R. 111).
Jerry had wired the defendant for money (R. 114). Jerry
expected to get the proceeds from the defendant's uranium
claim; ( R. 115), the friendship she had for the defendant
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developed because "he came across with his money easy"
(R. 112).
The defense called one Dan Gordon as a witness. Gordon was a trailer salesman (R. 116). He allegedly rented
a trailer to Jerry, the rental to apply on the purchase price
(R. 117). The witness stated that Jerry made all the rental
payments but one; (R. 118) that the redheaded girl (Bobby) made the last payment which was made on December
20th (R. 118). On cross examination Gordon said that Jerry
put up collateral for the trailer, (R. 120) three diamond
~1
rings (R. 121). One was a man's ring-one and 75/100
carats (R. 122)-this ring the witness was still holding
IIi
(R. 123 j. The record is silent as to what became of the
~
other two-presumably Jerry did not leave the rings bel:c
hind as she did the trailer.
Jerry was recalled to the witness stand for further
cross examination by the state. The defendant had given
Jerry the man's diamond ring as a present but for a consideration (R. 125).

~~

j

j

Charles 0. Chapman, a fellow inmate of the defendant
~~ at the Monticello bastille, was called for the defense. This
~~ witness proffered testimony to the effect that Bobby had
a~ visited the defendant at the jail and attempted to induce
1~w!i the defendant to plead guilty and take the pressure off so
~~~~ that Bobby and Pat would be turned loose (R. 125, 129).
n~w.i The state called Mr. Frank Pester as a rebuttal witness and
1
'lf the witness thought that Charles 0. Chapman was standing
HI·' too far away from the defendant and Bobby to have overrJ!·

1lif>

~a~
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heard the conversation between them to which Chapman
had testified.
Upon the evidence, instructions, and argument of
counsel, the cause went to the jury.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
WANT OF CORROBORATION OF THE VICTIM'S TESTIMONY.

POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR BY FAILING TO
DEFINE TO THE JURY THE MEANING OF
CRIMINAL INTENT.

POINT III
THE COURT SUFFICIENTLY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY AS TO CORROBORATION OF THE
VICTIM'S TESTIMONY.

POINT IV
REFUSAL OF DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS NO. 3 AND 4 WAS NOT ERROR.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
WANT OF CORROBORATION OF THE VICTIM'S TESTIMONY.
To sustain a conviction for pandering the testimony
of the victim must be corroborated. State v. Smith, 2 U.
2nd 358, 284 P. 2d 246. We have no quarrel with this pronouncernent of the law for which defendant claims. However, there is nothing in State v. Smith, supra, which would
indicate that the corroborative evidence required be other
than that necessary under Section 77-31-18, U. C. A. 1953.
Therefore, the corroboration need not go to all of the rnaterial facts as testified by the victim, nor need it be sufficient in itself to support a conviction; it may be slight and
entitled to little consideration. It must connect the defendant with the comrnrnission of the offense and be inconsistent with his innocence and must do more than cast a
grave suspicion on the defendant all without the aid of the
testimony of the accomplice. State v. Vigil, . . U. . .. ,
260 P. 2d 539, and cases there cited.

B(
ff;l

~(.

~;
r;~:

['[U
·~

What, then, in this case, is the evidence completely
aside from the testimony of the victim, Pat, which connects
the defendant with the offense charged?
:~

T~

Bobby testified that Pat was employed by the defendant at a stipulated wage only to tend bar; that for two
days Pat tended bar and did not become a prostitute until
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after the defendant proposed to Pat that she do so and
suggested that there would be more money for Pat in it
that way. Bobby testified that the defendant attended the
daily needs of the trailer house and that for a period he
took his meals there. Bobby was not an accomplice and her
testimony needed no corroboration and was alone sufficient to prove the offense charged. State v. Davie,
U.
, 240 P. 2d 263. But there is m.ore.
Jerry testified that prior to Pat's employment by the
defendant Pat knew nothing of prostitution and could not
answer questions pertaining thereto. Jerry testified that
the defendant attended to errands for her while she was
residing at the trailer ; that the defendant left his clothes in
the trailer house when she was occupying the premises.
Although Jerry claimed ownership of the trailer, she admitted that the large diamond ring used as collateral for
the purchase of the trailer came from the defendant. The
defense witness, Dan Gordon, testified as to the diamond
ring, and as to the fact that Bobby, the redhead, made at
least one payment on the trailer after Jerry had departed
the state. There was abundant evidence to connect the
defendant with the trailer house and with the goings on
thereat.
There was ample competent evidence adduced from
which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant perpetrated the crime of pandering. When
such competent evidence appears in the record, there can
be no error in failing to direct a verdict of acquittal, State
v. Peterson, . . U. . , 240 P. 2nd 504; or in refusing to
grant a motion to dismiss. The rule applicable when a
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motion to dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of the
evidence is, as stated by this court:
"The rule which must be applied upon a motion
to dismiss a criminal case is that all reasonable inferences are to be taken in favor of the state, and
only if the record itself reveals that no reasonable
man could draw an inference of guilt therefrom is
the trial court justified in taking the case from the
jury." State v. Thatcher, 108 U. 63, 157 P. 2d 258.
In State v. Penderville, 2 U. 2nd 281, 272 P. 2d 195, the
court said:
"It has been repeatedly held by this court that
upon a motion to dismiss or to direct a verdict of not
guilty for lack of evidence that the trial court does
not consider the weight of the evidence or credibility of the witnesses, but determines the naked
legal proposition of law, whether there is any substantial evidence of the guilt of the accused, and all
reasonable inferences are to be taken in favor of
the state. State v. Lewellyn, 71 Utah 331, 266 P.
261; State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157 P. 2d 258;
State v. Aures, 102 Utah 113, 127 P. 2d 872; State
v. Peterson, . . Utah ... , 240 P. 2d 504. As is
pointed out in one or more of these cases, the trial
court has a discretion in the case of a motion for a
new trial that it does not have in case of a motion
to dismiss or to direct a verdict of not guilty."

]i· f:
ili~

The trial court did not err in this case and could have
properly done only what it did do in denying the motion
for directed verdict or to dismiss the information.

j~i

re~
le~
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POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR BY FAILING TO
DEFINE TO THE JURY THE MEANING OF
CRIMINAL INTENT.
No instruction was requested of the court as to the
meaning of "intent" or "criminal intent" as that word
"intent" was used in Instruction No. 2 as given by the court.
This court in such cases has said:
"It is the court's duty to try the issues made
by the parties and not to make cases for them. We
have held that where instructions are palpably erroneous to such an extent that they would, if followed by the jury, prevent a fair or proper determination of the issues, we may notice the error without
exception having been taken. State v. Cobo, 90 Utah
89, 60 P. 2d 952; State v. Waid, 92 Utah 297, 67 P.
2d 647. But we are aware of no holding that the
mere failure to give an instruction which might have
been given but which was not requested or called to
the attention of the court, and no exception taken
to the failure to give it will be noticed on appeal."

State v. Peterson, supra, see also State v.
Mitchell, . . U ... , 278 P. 2d 618, 622.
The inquiry here then is: was the instruction so palpably
erroneous that, if followed by the jury, it would prevent a
fair or proper determination of the issues? We think not;
specific intent was not an issue of the crime charged. The
statutory offense was the act of inducing, persuading, encouraging or enticing the victim to become a prostitute;
although all "common law crimes" consist of two elements,
namely, the criminal act or omission and the mental ele-
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ment the legislature may dispense with necessity for a
criminal intent and punish particular acts without regard
to mental attitude of the doer. Simmons v. State, 10 So.
2nd 436, 438, 151 Fla. 778. The defendants' cause was not
prejudiced by the court's failure to define the meaning of
"intent" ; no specific intent was necessary to constitute the
offense.
POINT III
THE COURT SUFFICIENTLY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY AS TO CORROBORATION OF THE
VICTIM'S TESTIMONY.
Appellant claims instruction No. 11 erroneous for the
wm
reason that the instructions permitted the jury to "specu1.~1f late as to what was meant by "corroborative" testimony.
~.; For this contention appellant relies upon no authority other
11W
than the legal definition of "corroborative evidence". It
m~t
rtl& has been held that :
11

"The word 'corroboration' is not one of technical meaning but is in ordinary use, and its meaning
is generally understood, and the court is not required
to instruct the jury what the word means." Austin
v. State, 101 S. W. 1162, 51 Tex. Cr. R. 327.
w~

1~

The general rule appears to be that terms in common use
,iliiJII with well understood meaning need no special definition.
~~· See American Digest System, Criminal Law, key 800(2).
Further, here again, no such instruction was requested.
10~
Respondent's argument on Point II, supra, is equally applicrro.(
able here.
·o~
roenW
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POINT IV
REFUSAL OF DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS NO. 3 AND 4 WAS NOT ERROR.
Defendant requested the following instruction:
"You are instructed that in order for defendant
to be guilty as charged in the information on file
herein, the State must have shown by the eviden~
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant made Ida
E. Duclo, also known as Pat A. Morgan, certain
promises and inducements which she relied upon and
which actually tended to cause her to become a prostitute.
"If you find from the evidence that the said Pat
Morgan, also known as Ida Duclo became a prostitute without any promises or inducements which
caused her to become such, then you must return a
verdict in favor of defendant, not guilty."
The court below was thus asked to instruct the jury that
the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
promises and inducements made to the victim by the defendant actually tended to cause her to become a prostitute.
That is not the law in this jurisdiction and the instruction
was properly refused; for:
"Success is not a necessary component of the
crime." State v. Gates, 118 U. 172, 221 P. 2d 878.
Defendant also asked the court below to instruct the
jury:
"You are instructed that in ·order for you to
find defendant guilty of pandering, under Section
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76-53-8, U. C. A. 1953, you must find that defendant's persuasions, inducements or suggestions, if
any, were the efficient or moving cause in bringing
about the illicit relations wherein, Ida E.. Duclo, also
known as Pat A. Morgan, became a prostitute.
"If you find from the evidence that the said
Ida E. Duclo, also known as Pat A. Morgan, did not
engage in illicit relations and became a prostitute
because of anything defendant may have said to her,
but rather that she became a prostitute upon her
own volition and that she engaged in prostitution
because of her own independent desire to do so, then
you must find the issues in favor of defendant and
return a verdict of not guilty."
This instruction was objectionable for the identical reason;
it mattered not whether the defendant's persuasion, inducements or suggestions did in fact cause the victim to
become a prostitute any more than it mattered whether
8he became one or not.

Ul

~:~

Each party is entitled to his theory of the case which
1t!l:l is supported by competent evidence, State v. Newton, 105
U. 561, 144 P. 2d 290. An examination of the record in the
~ri case, however, does not disclose any testimony or other
ifu1i evidence which would sustain defendant's theory that the
victim was already a prostitute; the presumption is that
she was chaste before the defendant induced her to become
l@ti
J ~j\
a prostitute. State v. Smith, supra. The defendant's own
witness, Jerry, testified that the victim knew nothing of
n.4!'t prostitution even though she, Jerry, claimed that the victim's husband had contended that Pat had "worked" before.
[orr There is no merit to the contention that the court should
i~~
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have instructed the jury on the defendant's theory of the
case in the absence of substantial evidence to sustain such
theory.

CONCLUSION
The verdict should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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